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A Sad Tale of the Deepwater Horizon
Disaster, Normal Accidents, and Our
Appetite for Risk
Thomas C. Galligan, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION

Michael Beard, the protagonist of Ian McEwan's 2010 novel,
Solar, is a man whose appetites consume him. He has insatiable
needs for food, alcohol, fame, money, and sex. As the novel and
his life proceeds, he seems to consume more and more and more of
each (and, as a result, he grows!). At the same time, his
consuming habits are, for the most part, immune to the
restraining force of any overarching morality. As the novel
concludes,' the effects of Beard's dishonesty, gluttony, serial
sexual encounters, egomania, and greed are headed at one another
at such explosive speed and intensity that the reader might
imagine Beard in Mr. Creosote's chair-about to blow. 2 Typically,
McEwan's darkly comedic tale includes more than a touch of
irony. For my purposes here, one of the ironies is that Beard's last
* President and Professor of Humanities, Colby-Sawyer College. The author
has worked as a consultant with the Plaintiffs' Steering Committee in the
litigation arising out of the Deepwater Horizon, but that work did not include
this project.
1. The final scene of the novel is actually not unlike the final episode of
The Sopranos in which the viewers ask themselves if the characters' lives are
all just going to continue to some tragic or inevitable end or whether the
nuclear Soprano family is about to be shot down in a restaurant. Likewise,
with Michael Beard-will he wriggle out of his mess or is he about to drop
dead? We will never know.
2. In the Monty Python film The Meaning of Life, Mr. Creosote eats
and drinks so much that one last morsel causes him to literally explode,
albeit while continuing to live.
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quest for fame and fortune involves the development and
implementation of an alternative energy employing solar power.
Thus, Beard is a do-gooder trying to save the planet but he is
doing it for all the wrong reasons; he is a futurist crippled by some
good old vices.
Like Michael Beard, we twenty-first century citizens of the
And many of our
world have some insatiable appetites.
appetites-cars, computers, lights, air travel, marine transport,
television, satellite radio, air conditioning, heat-require energy.
In order for us to enjoy our lives the way we want to enjoy them,
we need energy. And a lot of the energy we have consumed and
continue to depend upon requires fossil fuel. We are addicted to
things that need oil and/or gas. And, while we may argue about
how much oil and gas is left and where it may be, we must all
agree that the supply is limited. And we must agree that we have,
over the years, begun to seek oil and gas in harder and harder to
reach places, including under the seas. And we must also agree
that our need for fossil fuel has required us to depend upon other
nations for some of our oil supply and that our dependency
requires us to ship oil and gas by pipeline or ship or truck over
great distances. We must also agree that the risks of disaster are
great when the extraction process goes awry or when the
transport results in spills. People working on a well can be killed
or hurt; the environment can be damaged; innocent bystanders
might sustain injury; and the economy can be disrupted.
Today, the many interrelated systems through which we seek,
discover, extract, transport, and consume fossil fuels are big and
complex. And they are risky. The Deepwater Horizon disaster is
a tragic and brutal example of what happens when those risks
materialize. So, what do we do? And, what can we learn from the
Deepwater Horizon disaster?
Can we somehow change to
minimize future risk? If we can minimize risk, how can we do so?
Or, are such disasters simply inevitable in a dangerous, complex
world? These are just a few of the questions I will seek to raise
here and to initially address, although complete solutions are
beyond this paper and probably beyond our current knowledge.
THE DEEPWATER HORIZoN-A BRIEF SUMMARY
For purposes of this essay, I will very briefly summarize the
events that took place in the Gulf of Mexico during the spring and
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summer of 2010. On April 20, a blowout occurred in a well being
drilled from a semi-submersible rig, the Deepwater Horizon. The
Deepwater Horizon was owned by Transocean. Maritime law
generally treats a semi-submersible rig as a vessel 3-a factor that
impacts some of the analysis below because it means some or all of
the legal issues arising from the disaster are governed by
maritime law. At the time of the blowout, the Deepwater Horizon
was chartered to a venture in which BP was the controlling
investor. The blowout resulted in an explosion and fire. Eleven
men died; others were injured. The Deepwater Horizon listed and
then sank.
As the tragedy played out, oil spewed from the wellhead and
drifted towards land. As oil swirled through the water, the media
swirled around the story. Several efforts to cap the well or
otherwise contain the leak failed until, finally, the relevant actors
contained the spill in July. In the meantime, oil had spread
throughout the Gulf of Mexico and had reached land in several
Gulf States. Fisheries were affected. The local economies from
fishing to boating to tourism were adversely impacted. President
Obama ordered a moratorium on offshore drilling. Congress held
hearings. BP set up a mandated claims adjustment process and
agreed to create a twenty billion dollar fund to compensate the
injured. Affected people and businesses filed claims with BP and
they also filed lawsuits against BP and other involved parties.
Investigations were conducted. Law schools and others held
symposia; law review articles were written.
HUMAN

NATURE AND THE HUNT FOR BLAME

Inevitably, after a disaster like this, people want to know who
is responsible. And, I daresay, we humans love a story, as my
allusion to Solar proves about me. And, like many humans, I
usually want my explanatory story to have a villain. If I find a
Michael Beard, I feel better. I feel better because I tell myself that
I am not like him. I tell myself that I do not selfishly live my life
like he did. I tell myself that I am not motivated by self-interest
and greed. I tell myself that I am a moral agent and that my
morality exercises a real curbing effect on my more primal
3.
1991).

See, e.g., Bonmarito v. Penrod Drilling Corp., 929 F.2d 186 (5th Cir.
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tendencies. I tell myself that certainly the Michael Beards of the
world are few and far between. I tell myself that if it were not for
So, in the
the villain none of this would have happened.
aftermath of disaster, I want to know who did what wrong and I
want to know why. I sleep better when I can point to the
wrongdoer. When I find a Michael Beard, I do not ask myself just
how much like Michael Beard I might be or how some of his traits
are endemic to us as people and as a culture. I sigh a sad breath
and keep on living my (energy consuming) life. But is the villain
real or is he or she a fictional creation to make me feel better?
As the litigation and investigations continue in the Deepwater
Horizon cases we will seek to identify what went wrong and
exactly why. That is what tort litigation and investigation is all
about. We seek out and identify those at fault and we seek to
make them pay for the damages that they caused. Moreover, after
a disaster in a regulated industry, we wonder where the
regulators were and what they were thinking. As for offshore
drilling, we have learned that the regulatory scheme was flawed;
the relationships between the regulators and the regulated were
close-so close that the Minerals Management Service (MMS) has
been restructured as the Bureau of Ocean Energy (BOE) in the
wake of the spill to limit the effects of any possible agency capture.
Once we fix those relationships, will our future be safer?
INEVITABLE ACCIDENTS, NORMAL ACCIDENT THEORY, AND TORT LAW
Are some accidents and even some fault-as in tortious
behavior-inevitable in the complex systems we have created? It
may be that even after we fix the regulatory scheme, if indeed we
can, that there is still risk and perhaps even unacceptable risk. It
may be that in complex and dangerous systems, accidents are
inevitable.4 If that is the case, what can we do? And, how can we
analyze those systems and perhaps improve our plight? As a torts
teacher, this question fascinates me because it gets to the heart of
what I have spent much of my adult life teaching and writing

4. Critically, inevitable does not mean that the accident is not the
result of what the tort lawyer and judge call fault. It may be that an actor's
negligence was inevitable. In the law we often refer to an inevitable accident
as one occurring without fault. That is not the way in which I use the word
in this piece.
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about. Has it all been for nothing if some accidents are simply
inevitable?
In his groundbreaking work, Normal Accidents,5 Charles
Perrow laid out a framework for analysis, "normal accident
theory," that I will use to shape my essay here. While others have
relied on and built upon Perrow's framework, 6 I will use his
statement of the theory as the groundwork for my discussion. And
I will not do the detail of his analysis justice; I will focus on its
broad outlines.
NORMAL ACCIDENT THEORY EXPLAINED
Perrow opines that as we develop new complex technologies
we increase risk for "operators, passengers, innocent by-standers,
and for future generations."7
Some of these systems have
catastrophic potential. Perrow believes that there are things to
be done to minimize certain risks-and I will talk extensively
about how tort law and regulation together can do that. He also
believes that certain risks are, from a systemic perspective,
inevitable. 9
It is these inevitable accidents that he calls
"normal."' 0
To Perrow, an accident is an "unintended and untoward
event"" that "involves some damage to people, objects, or to
both."12 He reserves the term accident for serious matters that
disrupt a subsystem or array of units or the whole system itself.13
It is the characteristics of high risk systems that make accidents
"normal" or "inevitable." Those characteristics are the foci of his

5.

CHARLES

PERROW,

NORMAL

ACCIDENTS: LIVING WITH

HIGH-RISK

TECHNOLOGIES (Princeton Univ. Press 1999) (1984).
6. See id. at 353-87. While I had heard of and read about Perrow's

work over the years, I was reintroduced to it when reading Bill Davidow's
fascinating new book, Overconnected, which analyzes the internet's effect on
our lives, our financial systems, and more.

See WILLIAM H. DAVIDOW,

OVERCONNECTED: THE PROMISE AND THREAT OF THE INTERNET (2011).

7.

PERROW, supra note 5, at 3.

8. I shall include in the catastrophic effects the loss of life, personal
injury, long-term debilitating effects of a disaster, adverse economic impact,
and environmental impact.
9.

PERROW, supra note 5, at 3.

10.

Id. at 3-4.

11.

Id. at 63.

12.

Id. at 64.

13.

Id.
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analysis.
Understanding those system characteristics might allow us to
minimize risk, rather than constantly seeking the person or
component to "blame."l 4 That is, it may not just be Michael Beard
that is to blame. What are the characteristics of the systems of
which he is a part that might lead to his fault and potential
disaster?
Perrow's theory postulates that the more complex the system
and the more tightly coupled the system, the more likely it is that
there will be normal accidents.15 Complex systems are more likely
to present failures by operators or failures in design that are not
easily or readily identified or understood. Additional safety
features may do little more than increase system complexity or
encourage supervisors to push for more or faster operation.
In tightly coupled systems "processes happen very fast and
can't be turned off, the failed parts cannot be isolated from other
parts, or there is no other way to keep the production going
safely."l 6 Thus, recovery from the failure is impossible. Of course
better organization or design might, but will not necessarily,
improve the safety record.' 7
Before considering various particular areas in which normal
accidents might occur, such as nuclear power plants,
petrochemical plants, air travel, marine travel, dams, mines,
lakes, space, nuclear weapons, and DNA, Perrow identifies some
common themes in those systems or activities. First he notes that
operator error is often high on the list of causal factors." This fact
is consistent with my intuition that we humans like to find
someone to blame. But in a tone that indicates that he is
unsatisfied with that conclusion, Perrow opines that an operator
confronted with an unusual and unforeseen event is between a
rock and a hard place.19
Perrow also repeatedly points out that the operator, like all of
us, creates his or her own reality or expectation of what is going
on and then interprets events in light of that construct. If what is
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 4.
Id. at 4-5.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 9.
Id.
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happening is, in fact, inconsistent with that construct, the
operator will not accurately interpret the events, and the operator
will not know that his underlying assumptions are incorrect until
things have seriously begun to unravel. If the system is tightly
coupled, by the time the real events become clear to the operator,
the possibility that it is too late to fix things will be much greater.
MINIMIZING OPERATOR ERROR-AN INITIAL INQUIRY

I would like to interject several thoughts here. First, it seems
that even if some accidents are inevitable, we must search for
ways that systems will minimize or reduce operator error. I have
a colleague who, when talking about our efficiency at ColbySawyer College, is constantly emphasizing training. He is right.
And, in the accident setting it seems basic that training can
minimize or reduce risk. It may not-per Perrow-eliminate risk,
but it can reduce it. Likewise, I believe that the threat of liability
can act as a deterrent to operators and managers. Knowing that
the failure to exercise due care either in operation or in preparing
operators to do their job, or in designing systems to sensibly
mitigate the harsh effects of operator error, will result in liability
would incentivize people to pay the reasonable costs of avoiding
the error or its effects. 20 If I may have to pay a cost, I will take
account of it when I decide what to do and how to do it. Accident
costs are but one of the costs of one's activities.
Sociologically, shifting away from the deterrent effect of tort
law, and returning to something I said earlier, the conclusion that
it was operator error that caused an accident satisfies our
yearning to find a "villain." When I say villain I do not necessarily
mean some evil person somewhere. Rather I mean concluding
that operator error was to blame for a disaster satisfies our
human need to find a responsible person and then to sigh and say:
"If only that person had done his or her job properly this terrible
thing would not have happened." That conclusion and the sad
peace that comes from it may distract us from another causal
factor such as inadequate training, inadequate design, pressure to
produce at dangerously high levels, managerial decisions to not
20. See generally Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Death at Sea: A Sad Tale of
Disaster,Injustice, and Unnecessary Risk, 71 LA. L. REV. 787, 809-12 (2011)
[hereinafter Galligan, Death at Sea].
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invest in safety, or inadequate government regulation. So, finding
an operator who is (partly) responsible because he or she somehow
erred should not be either the goal or the end of the inquiry.
NORMAL ACCIDENT THEORY CONTINUED-THE IMPORTANCE OF
ORGANIZATION
Back to Perrow, after noting the frequency with which
operator error is listed as a causal factor, he points out that "great
events have small beginnings" 2 1 and that transformation
processes involving "chemical reactions, high temperature and
pressure, or air, vapor, or water turbulence"22 are particularly
prone to small failures that quickly get out of control.
Perrow also notes the importance of organization in his
analysis. That is, because a normal accident may result from the
"mysterious interaction of failures, those closest to the system, the
operators, have to be able to take independent and sometimes
quite creative action." 23
This fact counsels one to create
decentralized governance structures under which operators have
the power and authority to act. At the same time, if the system is
tightly coupled and the effects of a failure spread fast, then no
single operator can ever be aware or able to deal with the entire
system or an impending accident. This fact counsels centralized
governance 24 structures that control operators. "But systems
cannot be both decentralized and centralized at the same time."25
Therefore, there is a tension and the best or optimal governance
structure is not obvious, clear, or even possible.
Consider the governance quandary in the context of a semisubmersible floating rig.26 Even if everyone on the rig worked for
the same entity (something that never happens), there would still
21.

PERROW, supra note 5, at 9.

22. Id. at 10.
23. Id.
24. On governance complexities and the BP disaster, see generally, Hari
M. Osofsky, Multidimensional Governance and the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil
Spill, 63 FLA. L. REv. 1077 (2011).
25. Perrow, supra note 5, at 10.
26. Let us assume without deciding that a semi-submersible rig is a
complex system that is tightly coupled. Between floating in one place,
dealing with environmental factors, and drilling for oil or natural gas, this
does not seem to be an unrealistic conclusion. But even if the system is not
complex or tightly coupled, we can still learn from the Perrow theory.
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be the tension Perrow notes regarding central and decentralized
governance.
An added level of complexity is whether the
centralization, to the extent it exists, should have the master of
the vessel at the top of the pyramid or the person in charge of
drilling operations at the top of the pyramid. A third complexity
involves the extent to which on the ground (as opposed to on the
rig) personnel should play a role (and what role) in the centralized
governance of the system (assuming some level of centralization is
desired).
To make matters even more complex, how does meaningful
centralization (if desired) occur where the master of the vessel
(rig) works for one company and the head of drilling operations
(the company man) works for another? That is, the master of the
vessel works for the vessel owner and the head of drilling
operations works for the drilling principal. And, some of the
workers on the rig may be employed by third party contractors. 27
Finally, what roles do the on-the-ground folks play in the common
situation where multiple entities are engaged in the drilling
operation?
Certainly, the optimist might say, the parties can work all
that out between themselves by contract and conversation before
anything goes wrong. I am an optimist but my glasses are not
that rose-colored! Can we really expect multiple entities to agree
beforehand how they will allocate authority among themselves to
deal with unforeseen and unfamiliar failures before they happen
and that quickly trigger other problems throughout the system as
the whole event escalates towards a possibly catastrophic
accident? I do not think so.
In the context of the Deepwater Horizon there is another
factor involved: no one seemed to know what to do to fix it once
things went wrong. To the layperson, who is not a geophysicist or
an environmental engineer, it appears that once the explosion
occurred and the leak began, no one knew how to fix it. That is, it
took about three months to figure out how to stop the leak. Since
27. For instance, at least some of those regularly working on the
Deepwater Horizon worked for someone other than Transocean (the rig
owner) or BP (the principal partner in the drilling operation), such as
Haliburton, the entity in charge of the cement pouring needed to seal the
well. Moreover, another entity, Cameron International Corp., manufactured
the blow out preventer.
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it appears we did not know how to fix things when they went
wrong, I am dubious that before events occur reasonable people
could contractually (and practically) allocate responsibility for
dealing with unknown and unanticipated events that lead to
system failures we do not know how to repair. And, even if we
came up with a contractual allocation and better warnings and
better designs and better training methods, would people follow
them and use them or would they ignore them?
As Perrow states, "[olur ability to organize does not match the
inherent hazards of some of our organized activities. Better
organization will always help any endeavor. But the best is not
good enough for some that we have decided to pursue." 28
TORTS AND BETTER ORGANIZATION

The best may not be good enough but, as a torts teacher and
commentator, let me here emphasize the middle sentence-better
will always help. Tort liability and the threat of tort liability can
help us encourage entities to undertake to make their
organizations better. How much better? As good as one can
reasonably expect-i.e., reasonable care. No better, no worse. But
if we can reasonably expect better, the threat of tort liability
should cause it to happen. If not, then our society should expect
that the actors who did not exercise reasonable care to improve
their organizational structures to avoid a foreseeable risk should
pay if that failure in fact and legally caused that foreseeable risk
to arise and injure others. This improved organization, by
definition, cannot prevent an inevitable accident but it may delay
it; it may reduce its expected frequency; and it may mitigate its
harsh consequences.
NORMAL ACCIDENTS AND TECHNOLOGY

Thus, improving organizations will not eliminate normal
accidents, and Perrow is equally pessimistic that improving
technology will eliminate normal accidents in high risk/highly
complex/tightly coupled endeavors. As noted, some safety devices
or redundancies may only increase the number of unexplained,
Some
unexpected failures that cause system accidents:

28.

PERROW, supra note 5, at 10.

274 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITYLAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:264
technological improvements will lead only to increased pressure to
run systems longer, faster, and harder because they supposedly
make the system safer.
To the legal economist, increasing operations or speed is an
example of increasing the frequency or level of an activity.29 Thus,
increasing the frequency or level of an activity may increase the
number of accidents or increase the amount of care necessary to
limit the frequency of an accident or mitigate the harshness if one
occurs. That is what is reasonable from an efficiency standpoint.
THE VICTIMS OF NORMAL ACCIDENTS

In refining his analysis, Perrow considered the definition and
scope of possible accident victims. I will linger here to explore his
definitions and scope of victims and apply and compare his victim
categories to the Deepwater Horizon and to other disaster victims.
I will focus particularly on how Perrow's categories relate to the
way we compensate real victims for their injuries.
A. First Party Victims
According to Perrow, the first-party victims are the operators
of the system. These "include not only those actually running the
system ... but others in attendance on regular shifts, such as
first-level
supervisors,
maintenance
personnel,
low-level
engineering personnel, and laborers and assisting personnel."30 In
the context of the Deepwater Horizon, the first-party victims
would include everyone on board the rig the night of the explosion
who was involved in the production and exploration for oil and
natural gas and who suffered some injury. Clearly, the eleven
workers who were killed were first-party victims. 3 1 So are the
workers who may have suffered some physical injury in the
explosion or aftermath or severe emotional distress as a result of
the episode, as well as any who must undergo medical monitoring
as a result of exposure to any toxins released during the blast.
29. See STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAw 2 (1987).
30. PERROW, supra note 5, at 67.
31. In a way, the law makes the survivors of those killed who might
receive some death benefit or recover in wrongful death first-party victims as
well. Or they may be treated as third-party victims, as discussed infra,
whose right to recover is based on their relationship with the decedent firstparty victim.
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1. First Party Victims and Their Rights
How do Perrow's first-party victims fare under current
American systems for compensating injured workers, including
the tort system? Does their treatment result in liability (and
recovery) that is consistent with our notions of corrective justice
and the deterrence function of tort law? The answer is complex
and nuanced, and as such, the discussion here cannot hope to
provide a conclusive answer, but we can hope to raise and analyze
some of the critical issues.
2. Assumption of the Risk
Let us begin the effort with an overly simplified economic
view of the world of risk, which is both unsatisfactory and
unpersuasive. That view provides that the first-party victim
should not recover at all because his or her wage for working in a
dangerous job already includes a risk premium. That is, the
worker should not recover because the wage he or she receives
already compensates him or her for the risk of being injured,
albeit at an appropriately discounted rate which takes into
consideration the expected frequency of any injury and the
anticipated severity of that injury should it occur. 32 Implicit in
the argument is the idea that the employer has already built the
cost of the employee's injury into its cost and pricing structures
32. Judge Richard Posner weaves this thinking into his analysis in
United States Fidelity & Guarnty. Co. v. JadranskaSlobodna Plovidba when
he says, in relation to the Learned Hand formula for negligence:
If a shipowner were to follow a practice that flunked the Hand
formula - that in other words was not cost-jusitified . . . - then he

would have to pay his stevedores higher rates, to compensate them
for the additional risk to their employees, the longshoremen, whom
the stevedores must compensate under 33 U.S.C. § 904, regardless of
fault, for any injury the longshoremen sustain in the course of their
employment.
683 F.2d 1022, 1028-29 (7th Cir. 1982). The claim there was for vessel
negligence under 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (2006) which authorizes a longshoreman
to file suit against a vessel owner for negligence, even if the vessel owner is
his or her employer. In that context, Judge Posner is saying that the worker
would clearly have demanded more pay if the worker had understood that the
shipowner engaged in negligent practices. One wonders how the worker
would know this fact beforehand. A more general discussion of the
bargaining that goes on between prospective employees and employers
appears in the next three paragraphs of text infra.
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through the wages it pays.
Perrow appropriately doubts that the contention is tenable
and I agree with him. As Perrow noted, "[tihere is no clear
Sharing Perrow's
relationship between risk and pay."3 3
skepticism, I add my own intuitive sense that most workers do not
know just how dangerous a job is before they sign on. In addition,
even workers who sign on for a dangerous career, knowing those
risks, still might have little or no knowledge of particular
assignments that may be more dangerous than their job as a
whole on average.
In the case of a rig out on the sea, even if a worker encounters
a particularly dangerous situation, he or she has little or no real
choice about what to do. Walking away is impossible and
demanding higher pay as a realistic option is comical. The
possibility that the workers together could protest the working
conditions and refuse to work would require them to go against
their natural inclinations to be loyal to their employers. And
because the rig is a vessel there would be a flavor of mutiny in the
air, although mutiny technically arises in the military context.
Thus, the argument that the worker is paid for risk through
wages, assumes that the worker has some meaningful bargaining
power when deciding what to do, for whom, and for how much.
The worker's ability to walk away depends upon alternative
available employment in the areas in which he or she is competent
to work. There does not seem to be much of that available in
today's America. Of course a strong union might play some role in
encouraging safety because its bargaining power is superior to the
single worker's, but in general, the strength of unions in America
has not been increasing.
Finally, the argument that the worker should not be able to
recover for injuries he or she suffers because he or she is
compensated for those risks through the negotiated wage is, at its
core, an assumption of the risk argument. In those terms the
argument provides that the worker, in accepting the employment
and accepting the wage, has accepted the risks of the employment.
The tort lawyer and student knows well that the injustice of the
assumption of risk defense 34 in the work place context was one of
33.
34.

PERROW, supra note 5, at 67.
The more accurate statement would note that the injustice was
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the very driving forces behind reform movements geared to
provide injured workers some recourse against their employers.
Assumption of the risk as a defense in the workplace setting was
essentially rejected then and was further eroded with the
widespread adoption of comparative fault. 35 It has been rejected
in fact and law and should also be rejected in theory.
3. FirstParty Victims and Workers' Compensation
So, what rights do first party victims have? In many
American jurisdictions their rights against their employers are
defined by the relevant workers' compensation statute. Workers'
compensation schemes generally provide a worker who is injured
in the course and scope of employment with a no-fault right to
recover certain defined and limited benefits from the employer.3 6
Typically the no-fault recovery is for two-thirds of the
worker's lost wages, medical expenses, and perhaps an additional
scheduled amount depending upon the injury.3 7 But, as a tradeoff for this no-fault recovery the employer is immune from the
employee's negligence claim. 38 As a result, the negligent employer
faces less than the full deterrent impact of the tort system because
its liability for workers' compensation is less than what it would
pay under the tort system-full lost wages, damages for pain and
suffering, damages for mental anguish, and any other applicable
damages. Of course, since the employer is also liable for injuries
(no-fault) for which it might not be liable in tort, the overall
deterrent effect of workers' compensation vis-A-vis tort liability
under a negligence regime would seem to be an empirical issue
dependent upon the particular context under examination.

amplified by the operation of the doctrine of contributory negligence as a bar
to recovery and the fellow servant rule-the "unholy trinity." See Boggs v.
Blue Diamond Coal Co., 590 F.2d 655, 658-59 (6th Cir. 1979); Thomas C.
Galligan, Jr., The Dreadful Remnants of The Osceola's Fourth Point, 34

RUTGERS L.J. 729, 735 (2003).
35.

See generally Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc., 521 So.2d 1123, 1129-30

(La. 1988).
36. See generally FRANK L. MARAIST & THOMAS C. GALLIGAN, JR.,
LouISIANA TORT LAW § 11.06 (2d ed. 2004).
37. 2 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 392 (2001).
38. Id. § 395.
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4. First Party Victims' Rights Against Third Parties
Even if the first party victim is limited to recovering workers'
compensation from the employer, he or she also has the possibility
of recovering in tort from any third party tortfeasor who is not the
employer. 39 These third party tortfeasors face the full deterrent
effect of the tort system. But, depending upon the relevant system
involved, the third party tortfeasor may or may not have any
ability to control or improve the system. Thus the potential
liability of third persons may not reduce the system's risk.4 0
Additional negative implications for the system's operation
and its potential failure arise if third parties who are working on
or in the system are less experienced, less knowledgeable, and less
skilled. If that is the case the possibility of accidents may actually
increase. 4 1 In that context, torts might play a key role in assuring
higher quality work by third parties. At the same time, if the
employer of an injured employee is in the best position to hire
competent third parties and, because of the workers' compensation
laws, the employee cannot sue his or her employer if it fails to
exercise reasonable care in hiring competent third parties, then
some of the deterrent power of torts may be lost.
The various interlaced relationships are further complicated
by the fact that there will often be reciprocal indemnity
agreements entered into between the employer and third parties,
whereby each contracting party agrees to indemnify the other
against any tort suits by their employees. If reciprocal indemnity
agreements are in place then each party to the contract (or its
insurer) will ultimately bear the financial brunt of any tort
recovery by its employees against another entity involved in the
system. But the deterrent impact of that liability is vague and
indirect at best: it incentivizes A to seek to make B safer because
if B negligently injures one of A's employees, A will ultimately
bear the brunt of B's liability under the reciprocal indemnity
39. Under various schemes some third parties may be immune from a
tort suit because they have either borrowed the employee or because a
statute or jurisprudence treats them as a "statutory" employer and grants
immunity. Absent such special cases the third party would be liable in tort.
40. If the third party were a component manufacturer potential liability
might result in a safer system. Likewise, if the third parties are employers of
workers involved in the system potential liability might improve the system.
41.

See PERROW, supra note 5, at 362.
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agreement. It is confusing at best.
5. FirstParty Victims at Sea: Herein of the Deepwater Horizon and
Underdeterrence
The world is even more confusing in the Deepwater Horizon
litigation because the Deepwater Horizon is a vessel. Therefore,
some of those workers on board the vessel were seamen. These
are workers who have meaningful employment on a vessel that is
substantial in nature and duration. Seamen do not have a right to
recover workers' compensation benefits from their employer.
Rather, under the Jones Act,42 which incorporates the relevant
portions of the Federal Employers Liability Act, 43 the seaman has
a right to recover in negligence from his or her employer.
Theoretically then, the seaman's employer faces the full deterrent
impact of the tort system. However, for any system to optimally
deter, the defendant or potential defendant must face the
potential of full, actual damages.
If potential damages are less than the actual damages the
victim suffered, then the relevant tort regime will underdeter. It
will not provide optimal deterrence because it will not, as
discussed below, force actors to take account of all the accident
costs their activities pose. In that context the rule that limits
liability is a negative externality. It is a cost the actor need not
pay, and, as stated above, if the actor need not pay it, then he or
she will not consider it in deciding what to do and how to do it. If
the defendant faces greater than full damages then the relevant
tort regime will overdeter.
Under the Jones Act, as interpreted, potential defendants face
less than the full costs of the injuries they cause because they are
not liable, in a wrongful death case, for the survivors' loss of
society damages." That is, there is no recovery for the loss of
care, comfort, or companionship arising out of the wrongful death.
This failure to allow recovery for loss of society damages is
contrary to the majority rule on land. It is out of date with
contemporary notions about the value of relationship itself. And it

42.
43.

46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2006).
45 U.S.C. § 51 (2006).

44.

See generally Galligan, Death at Sea, supra note 20, at 793-97.
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raises inconsistencies which I have addressed elsewhere. 4 5
This sad state of undercompensatory affairs is not limited to
seamen under the Jones Act. It is also true of any death where
liability was subject to the Death on the High Seas Act
(DOHSA).4 6 DOHSA applies to any death on the high seas or any
death, wherever it occurs, that proximately arises from an injury
incurred on the high seas. 4 7 Like the Jones Act, DOHSA does not
provide the survivors with the right to recover for loss of society
arising out of the wrongful death of a loved one. 48 Therefore, in
the workplace injury setting, if DOHSA applies, 49 the liability of
any tortfeasor is undercompensatory and tort law achieves less
than optimal deterrence.
To further undermine the deterrent power of tort liability in
the maritime setting, some courts have extended the liability
limiting reach of the Jones Act and DOHSA to maritime settings
to which those statutes do not specifically apply. 50 The reason for
that expansion and why I believe it was not supported by
precedent or persuasive policy are beyond the scope of this paper;
however, even if I am wrong on my reading of the law, the result
is still that defendants throughout maritime industry face less
than optimal deterrence from the tort system.
6. Perrow at Sea and Less Than Optimal Deterrence
In that regard, the positive deterrent impact tort law might
have within Perrow's normal accident theory vis-A-vis first party
victims is less than optimal. The offshoot of less than optimal tort
deterrence is that the normal accident-the inevitable accidentarising out of the maintenance and operation of high risk,
complex, tightly coupled systems might occur sooner or more often
than it otherwise would. Or the effects of those inevitable
45. See id. at 799-815.
46. 46 U.S.C. § 30302 (2006).
47. Motts v. M/V Green Wave, 210 F.3d 565, 569-72 (5th Cir. 2000).
48. 46 U.S.C. § 30303 (2006). The inconsistencies within the DOHSA
regime are even more stark than they are under the Jones Act since Congress
in 2000 amended DOHSA to allow recovery of loss of society damages to the
survivors of victims killed in high seas "commercial aviation" disasters, but
no one else. See 46 U.S.C. § 30307 (2006).
49. The complexities of when DOHSA would apply are discussed in
Galligan, Death at Sea, supra note 20.
50. See Galligan, Death at Sea, supra note 20, at 803-08.
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accidents might be more serious than they otherwise would
because tort law is not optimally encouraging system owners to
take reasonable measures to mitigate the harsh effects of the
inevitable accident.
B. Second Party Victims
In Perrow's taxonomy, second party victims are those
associated with the system as suppliers or users but who cannot
influence it. 5 1 In the context of the Deepwater Horizon, most of
those on board the rig had influence over the system so they would
not be second party victims. However, in the maritime setting,
Perrow notes that passengers could be second party victims. On
land a second party victim may be someone delivering a package
to a plant when an accident occurs. To some extent second party
victims have accepted some risk associated with the system.5 2 For
instance, they know the ship might sink or that a high risk,
complex plant is not the safest of places. But they really cannot do
much of anything to prevent the accident or minimize its impact.
What rights do second party victims have against system
operators or managers? They do not have the right to recover for
workers' compensation from the operator 53 because they are not
employees of the operator or manager. They do have the right to
recover in negligence if they can establish fault. If they cannot
establish fault they would generally not recover at all. In order
for tort law to achieve optimal deterrence, second party victims
would have to have the right to recover full actual damages. And,
for the passengers, if the death or accident occurred on the high
seas, the survivors would not recover full damages because they
would not recover their loss of society damages under the DOHSA.
C. Third Party Victims
Perrow's third party victims are innocent bystanders. These
are people who have no involvement in the system. 54 In the
context of the Deepwater Horizon, third party victims include
51.

PERROW, supra note 5, at 68.

52.

Id.

53.

The delivery person may have the right to recover workers'

compensation from his or her employer but not from the system operator.
54.

PERROW, supra note 5, at 68.
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everyone who was injured as result of the explosion or leak but
who played no role on the rig. This would include governmental
stewards of damaged natural resources, fishers whose economic
livelihood was impaired, landowners whose property was damaged
by oil, and the thousands of business owners who suffered
economic injury as a result of the spill in terms of lost sales, lost
revenues and more. What rights do these folks have under our
legal system?
Generally, anyone who suffered property damage has a
garden variety negligence claim based in negligence against the
tortfeasor. The injured property owner may also have a strict
liability claim against the system operator for engaging in an
ultrahazardous or abnormally dangerous activity. 55 Commercial
fishers could also recover for their losses under the general
maritime law even though they did not have any ownership or
proprietary interest in the property.56 Governmental entities
responsible for natural resources traditionally enjoyed an action
for public nuisance.
However, in many jurisdictions, those who suffered economic
loss, but not property damage, as a result of the tortfeasor's
negligence might not be able to recover for that economic loss,
absent a proprietary interest in the thing damaged.57 This
economic harm rule is justifiably subject to criticism since it
results in severe underdeterrence and limits recovery even in
cases to which its real purpose (avoiding uncertain or double
recovery) does not apply.5 8 But its harsh effects remain.

Happily, in the oil spill context, Congress has replaced the no
recovery economic harm rule in oil spill cases and now allows

recovery under the Oil Pollution Act of 199059 (OPA) from a
responsible party, even if the injured party did not have an
ownership interest in the thing damaged.60 Under the OPA, all of
the parties identified above-the governmental entities, the

55.
56.

See discussion infra notes 68-87 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 567-71 (9th Cir.
1974); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C cmt. h, illus. 11 (1979).
57. See, e.g., Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927).

58.

See Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Contortions Along the Boundary

Between Contractsand Torts, 69 TUL. L. REv. 457, 512-20 (1994).
59. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2762 (2006).
60. Id. § 2702(b)(2)(B)-(C).
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property owners, and others-have a right to recover.61 The OPA
imposes strict liability, and although liability is initially capped,62
if the responsible party is grossly negligent or violates an
applicable regulation there is no cap. 63 Of course if the cap
applies and/or applicable tort rules do not take account of all
actual injures, the liability scheme will not achieve optimal
deterrence.
Potential Deepwater Horizon third party victims would
include rescue and cleanup workers who may suffer some personal
injury either now or in the future as a result of exposure to spilled
oil or the dispersant used to break up the oil as it travelled
towards shore. Their current injuries may include fear of
developing disease, increased risk of developing some condition, or
medical monitoring to detect any possible disease or injury early
on. A full discussion of those types of liability is beyond us here,
but I do not feel that I am out on a limb when I say that the tort
system has not settled on generally agreed upon rules to govern
such claims.
There is inconsistency from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction, and until those rules are clearly articulated and
consistently applied, the probability that torts will optimally deter
seems low.
D. Fourth Party Victims
Fourth party victims of normal accidents are "future"
claimants. They are
fetuses being carried at the time of exposure; the wouldbe children that damaged parents will not be able to
conceive; stillborn or deformed children conceived after
exposure; and all those people who will be contaminated
in the future by residual substances, including those
substances that will become concentrated as they move
up the food chain. 4
Hopefully, all the categories of fourth party victims identified
above are not included in the Deepwater Horizon disaster. But
there certainly will be such victims in other catastrophes. What is
61.

62.
63.
64.

Id. § 2702(b).

See infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
33 U.S.C. § 2704(a) & (c).
PERROW, supra note 5, at 69.
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said above about third party claims for fear of developing a
disease, increased risk of developing a disease, and medical
monitoring is certainly true of "future" plaintiffs. The law has not
arrived at a clear, consistent way to deal with such claims; thus
the possibility of achieving optimal deterrence is remote.
So, WHAT ROLE DOES TORT LIABILITY HAVE IN PREVENTING THE
INEVITABLE ACCIDENT?

Having analyzed the categories of victims Perrow identified
and what rights they may have under the tort system, and having
tried to briefly apply the schema to the Deepwater Horizon
disaster, let us step back and consider a meta-concern. Just how
does tort law fit together with Perrow's schematic? Does it have
any role to play at all? I have obviously shown above that I
believe torts does have a role to play-it can incentivize
investments in safety. I have pointed out examples of where I
believe an appropriately designed tort system could make the
world and systems safer. But it is worth reiterating that from
Perrow's perspective, a normal accident is inevitable. Thus, by
definition, the accident will occur even in the system where
everyone is exercising reasonable care. So, here, I intend to
examine the issue above the fray of the particular legal context
and view it from a more theoretical stance.
An accident is going to occur, but Perrow does not say how
soon or how often. So a tort system gauged to encourage optimal
investments in safety still has an important role to play. Just
what is a "fault based" tort system gauged to encourage optimal
investments in safety? It is a system in which the Learned Hand
formula for negligence plays a key and starring role. Hand most
cogently set forth that formula in an admiralty case, United States
v. CarrollTowing Co.6 5 As I have described the formula before:
Judge Learned Hand provided an algebraic or economic
definition of negligence in a series of cases decided in the
1940's.
His formulation merits consideration now.
According to Judge Hand, an actor was negligent when
the burden of avoiding an accident (B) was less than the
ex ante (before hand) probability of an accident occurring

65.

159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
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times the anticipated severity of the accident if it
occurred (P x L). The product of P times L represents the
ex ante cost of the accident. Thus, if B is less then P x L
the defendant who fails to undertake that burden (B) is
negligent. As such, Hand's formula encourages actors to
behave efficiently by spending up to but not over the ex
ante "cost" of the accident. Phrased differently, society
wants an actor to spend $99 (B) to avoid a $100 accident
(P x L); she is negligent if she fails to do so.
Alternatively, society does not want her to spend $101 to
avoid that same accident. So if B is $101 and P x L is still
$100, letting the accident happen and leaving the loss on
the victim is good for society, at least if it is societas
economicus.66
What role would an economically based negligence or fault system
play within Perrow's normal accident theory? While it may not
totally avoid the normal accident, as noted above, it might delay
it, make it less frequent, or mitigate its harshness if one does
occur.
In the context of the Deepwater Horizon, if one treats an oil
spill as an inevitable accident, one might still argue that
preserving liability for fault-based injuries is appropriate if fault
can be shown to have aggravated the possibility of the occurrence,
hastened its occurrence, or aggravated the death and injury that
would have occurred if the defendant had exercised reasonable
care.
From a torts perspective, what happens if a normal accident
occurs and the owner or manager of the system that caused the
accident exercised reasonable care in the way it operated the
system? First, simply because management exercised reasonable
care in operating the system does not mean that the system was
designed with reasonable care. Thus, if the injured victims could
prove negligent design then a negligence claim should still be
viable. To fail to allow that claim to go forward would thwart the
deterrent aspect of tort law.
Additionally, there is always the possibility that the decision
to undertake the activity in and of itself is unreasonable. That is,
66. Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Strict Liability in Action: The Truncated
Learned Hand Formula, 52 LA. L. REV. 323, 331 (1991).
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one might argue the activity is, given current knowledge, more
risky than useful. If that is the case, then engaging in the activity

itself is unreasonable and doing so is negligence under the Hand
formula.67 Certainly, the magnitude of the potential loss is critical
in applying the Hand formula, and when we do not know how to
stop a risk if it arises, the potential loss is even greater. The
benefits of recognizing a negligent activity claim are clear: optimal
deterrence. The drawbacks are doubts that a jury, or even a
judge, is in an appropriate position to weigh all the costs and
benefits of an activity. In the offshore drilling context, if the
plaintiffs in a case involving an offshore disaster argued that
offshore drilling in and of itself was negligent, how could a jury or
judge ever accurately consider all the costs and benefits of the
activity-risk of death, injury, and pollution versus increased
supply of oil and natural gas, jobs, national security, etc.? Even if
they could grasp the breadth of the issues, is it their role to do so?
I have great faith in the jury system but all might not agree.
But, what if there is no negligence at all in conducting the
system operations, in design, or in engaging in the activity in and

of itself? What role in that case for torts? One possibility would
be to let the loss fall on the victims. Another would be to impose
strict liability on the operator.

One simple reason for strict

liability would be that the owner garners the profit from the
activity so let him or her bear the loss, as opposed to innocent or

more innocent victims.
Another rationale for strict liability would be to legally treat
the inevitable accident arising from a high risk, complex, tightly
coupled system that injures others as the paradigmatic
ultrahazardous or abnormally dangerous activity. 68 Strict liability
for engaging in an ultrahazardous activity is imposed under the
Third Restatement of Torts Liability for Physical and Emotional
67.

This discussion is reminiscent of the argument concerning "bad"

products. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) cmts.

d & e (1998). In the product liability context, the argument is whether there
should ever be liability for making a bad product-one that is more risky
than useful-even if it is properly manufactured and designed, and adequate
warnings are provided. See generally Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,
484 So.2d 110 (La. 1986).
68. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND
EMOTIONAL HARM § 20 (2010); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519, 520
(1977); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520 (1938).
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Harm section 20 under the following circumstances:
(a) An actor who carries on an abnormally dangerous
activity is subject to strict liability for physical harm
resulting from the activity.
(b) An activity is abnormally dangerous if:
(1) the activity creates a foreseeable and highly
significant risk of physical harm even when
reasonable care is exercised by all actors; and
(2) the activity is not one of common usage. 69
In the context of offshore drilling, the court would first have to
decide whether the doctrine of strict liability for engaging in an
ultrahazardous7 0 or abnormally dangerous activity applies in a
maritime case. If the court decided to apply the doctrine under
general maritime law, then, if the plaintiff established the
relevant criteria, a court would impose strict liability.
Under Perrow's normal accident theory, inevitable accidents
arise out of high-risk activities, thereby satisfying the "foreseeable
and highly significant risk of physical harm" criterion of section
(b)(1). Moreover, since the normal accident is inevitable, it is
risky even when reasonable care is exercised, satisfying the
second half of (b)(1). None of the activities that Perrow analyzes,
with the possible exception of air travel, are matters of common
usage.
Thus, they seem particularly appropriate for the
imposition of strict liability at the activity level.
Interestingly, in the oil spill context, Congress has imposed
69.

HARM

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL

§ 20 (2010).

70. The Restatement (Third) actually entitles the relevant section
"abnormally dangerous activities," as did the Restatement (Second) of Torts;
however, the Restatement (Third), in moving away from analyzing the
appropriateness of the activity to the place in which it is conducted actually
hearkens back to the Restatement. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 20 (2010) with RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519, 520 (1977). The First Restatement of Torts called
the relevant activities for which strict liability was imposed "ultrahazardous."
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS

§ 520 (1938). Whatever the title or precise elements,

the three Restatements sections on activity-based strict liability are clearly
related to one another and the relationship is close. All three impose liability
without negligence on dangerous activities which are dangerous even when
reasonable care is exercised and which are not matters of common usage.
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limited strict liability upon those responsible for oil spills. The
OPA deals with various aspects of responsibility for oil spills and
their clean-up. A "responsible party"7 1 is strictly liable 72 for
various categories of damage, including "[d]amages for injury to,
or economic losses resulting from destruction of, real or personal
property, which shall be recoverable by a claimant who owns or
leases that property."73 Thus, under the OPA, if a person was
designated as a "responsible party," he or she would be strictly
liable for covered damage, unless the responsible party could
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the spill was solely
caused by an act of God, an act of war, a third party act or
omission, or some combination of the above. 74 Before recovering
under the OPA, a claimant must present his or her claim.7 5 After
presentment, a damaged person may recover from the responsible
party or from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (up to one billion
dollars for any single incident)76 but the claimant may not recover
from the Fund while litigation is pending to recover those same
damages.77 For the most part, federal courts have exclusive
jurisdiction over OPA claims. 78
The responsible party's liability in a case involving a spill
from a vessel, would be subject to a liability cap depending upon
the vessel's size and type. 79 However, the cap is inapplicable80 if
the claimant establishes that the spill was proximately caused by
the responsible party's gross negligence, willful misconduct, or the
"violation of an applicable Federal safety, construction, or
operation regulation." 81 The responsible party also loses the
benefit of the cap if the violation of the applicable regulation was
committed by "an agent or employee of the responsible party, or a
person acting pursuant to a contractual relationship with the
71. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2006).
72. Kenneth M. Murchison, Liability Under the Oil Pollution Act:
Current Law and Needed Revisions, 71 LA. L. REV. 917, 927 (2011).
73. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(B).
74. Id. § 2703(a); see also Murchison, supra note 72, at 930.
75. 33 U.S.C. § 2713(a).
76. 26 U.S.C. §9509(c)(2)(A)(i) (2006).
77. 33 U.S.C. § 2713(b)(2).
78. Id. § 2717(b).
79. Id. § 2704(a).
80. The cap is also inapplicable to removal costs, but those are not at
issue in our hypothetical. See id. § 2704(b)(2).
81. Id. § 2704(c).
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responsible party (except where the sole contractual arrangement
arises in connection with carriage by a common carrier by rail)."8 2
The "responsible party" and anyone subject to liability under the
OPA can bring an action for contribution. 83 The OPA does not
deal with wrongful death or personal injury claims. Nor does it
deal with collision claims in admiralty. Additionally, "[e]xcept as
otherwise provided" it does not displace maritime law84 and it
expressly preserves liability under state law.85 And, it states that
the United States may even impose additional liability.86
Whatever the legal niceties concerning strict liability for
engaging in an ultrahazardous or abnormally dangerous activity,
or those involved in determining the scope of liability under the
Oil Protection Act of 1990, there is a sound theoretical basis for
imposing strict liability on the manager of the high risk, complex,
tightly coupled system that causes injury even in the absence of
negligence. That theoretical basis arises out of Judge Guido
Calabresi's groundbreaking book, The Costs of Accidents: A Legal
and Economic Analysis.8 7 Therein, Calabresi notes that when
considering deterrence and potential liability at the activity level,
it may make sense even in the absence of "negligence" to impose
liability on the cheapest cost avoider-the person in the best
position to avoid the cost.
In the context of an activity which imposes risk but which is
not being conducted negligently, the cheapest cost avoider might
well be the person in the best position to come up with a safer way
to accomplish the same end, or the person in the best position to
82. Id. § 2704(c)(1). Additionally, the responsible party loses the benefit
of the cap if it
[Flails or refuses - (A) to report the incident as required by law and
the responsible party knows or has reason to know of the incident;
(B) to provide all reasonable cooperation and assistance requested by
a responsible official in connection with removal activities; or (C)
without sufficient cause, to comply with an order issued under
subsection (c) or (e) of section 1321 of this title or the Intervention on
the High Seas Act (33 U.S.C. 1471 et seq).
Id. § 2704(c)(2).
83. Id. § 2709.
84. Id. § 2751(e).
85. Id. § 2718(a).
86. Id. § 2718(c).
87. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS (1970).
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identify alternative activities which may achieve the same or
similar benefits at less risk. In the case of offshore drilling, the
drillers and their related entities are clearly in a better position to
identify safer ways to conduct the activity. Those in charge of the
operations are in a much better position to achieve improved
safety than the workers, the fish, the land-based business owners,
or anyone else.
Whether liability, if it exists, is based on negligence or strict
liability, any rule that limits the potential liability of the
organizations engaged in the activity to less than the actual
injuries they cause will reduce the deterrent effect of tort law.
That is, if a legal rule limits the liability to less than the actual
damage caused, then the actor, when deciding what to do and how
to do it, will not face or consider all of the costs of its activities. It
will not face all the potential accident costs because of the
liability-limiting rule. As a result, it will not face the full
deterrent effect of potential liability, and tort law will not achieve
optimal investments in safety. This is the same problem we
discussed above in regards to the Jones Act and DOHSA, and the
inability to recover loss of society damages in a wrongful death
case arising under either or both of those two statutes.
In the atomic energy context, the Price-Anderson Act 8 8 limits
the liability of a nuclear power company, essentially to the amount
of any insurance available in the private market. 89 Our law is rife
with statutes limiting the liability of certain industries or
activities. 90 In the maritime setting, in addition to the limited
liability of the Jones Act and DOHSA in wrongful death, there is
also the Limitation of Liability Act. 9 1
The Limitation of Liability Act was originally passed in 1851
to encourage investment in maritime shipping and commerce. It
allows a vessel owner (and some others) to limit liability to the
post-voyage value of the vessel if the liability is incurred without
the privity or knowledge of the owner. 92 The vessel owner creates
a fund equal to the post-accident value of the ship (not including
42 U.S.C. § 2210 (2006).
89. Patrick J. Bonner, Limitation of Liability: Should it be Jettisoned
After the DeepwaterHorizon?, 85 TUL. L. REV. 1183, 1191 (2011).
90. See id. at 1185-94.
91. 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501-30512 (2006).
92. Id. § 30505(a)-(b).
88.
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the hull insurance). The claimants then share in the fund in
proportion to the value of their claims. Personal injury and
wrongful death claimants share with other claimants, but if the
vessel is a seagoing vessel and the fund is not adequate to provide
the personal injury and wrongful death claimants with recovery
equal to at least $420 times the gross tonnage of the vessel, the
owner must provide the difference, up to $420 per ton, but no
more. 93
Is the Limitation of Liability Act necessary today? Does it
serve a sound social policy? Do any of the many liability devices
we have created? As one commentator has said, these limits on
liability may exist
for the better of our overall society or as a trade-off for
some other more compelling need. There are many areas
in our jurisprudence where juries and trials are bypassed,
the amount of damages is limited for certain parties, or
the jury's damage verdict is changed, all for the greater
good of our society.94
The economic argument in favor of limitation would be that
somehow or other these beneficial activities create some good or
benefit that they cannot capture through the operation of the
market and therefore their costs must be lowered in order to make
up for the positive externality the activity creates. 95
But, is the theoretical reason for some special treatment for
certain activities always present when a legislature bestows a
boon such as limited liability? Does the legislature undertake the
appropriate cost-benefit analysis and provide the appropriate fix?
If so, someone would expect to see that calculation reflected in the
legislative history. Or, is a liability limitation merely the result of
a special interest group flexing its muscle?
And, even where some positive externality may exist or be
present, is liability limitation the way to fix it? Clearly the

93. Id. § 30506(b).
94. Bonner, supranote 89, at 1185.
95. It is worth emphasizing that limiting liability is the result of a
decision that somehow the market is not working because the existence of the
externality indicates a market failure. Normal market pricing mechanisms
are failing to take into account some benefit. That is, people are not willing
to pay for all of the benefits that the activity creates.
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answer is no; there are other vehicles such as subsidies or tax
breaks. A subsidy would be funded from the public fisc or perhaps
some tax on users of the relevant thing or participants in the
relevant activity. One example of subsidies or support to bring
about projects allegedly having positive externalities in the form
of economic benefits is subsidies or tax breaks to build stadiums
for athletic events. Another example is publicly backed financing
through government-guaranteed bonds. As noted, another way to
deal with the positive externality or benefit problem is to provide
a tax break; a tax break would result in lower revenue for the
governmental entity involved.
Moreover, when a liability limitation is created to serve some
supposedly more compelling need, the ones who suffer (i.e., the
ones who "pay the tax") are the people who do not recover as a
result of the limitation or the people who recover less than they
would have without the limitation. Where the liability limitation
is in the form of a cap, i.e., a $500,000 cap on damages or general
damages, it is the people who are the most seriously injured who
bear a disproportionate burden. There is a ring of inequity about
that. Interestingly, I am not aware of any situation in which the
net profits or salaries of those engaged in the dangerous activity
are also capped.
PERROW'S CONCLUSIONS AND TORTS
Circling back to Perrow's analysis, what broad conclusions
does he draw and what lessons do those conclusions provide for
the tort student? He stated:
I have a most modest proposal, but even though modest
and, I think, realistic, it is not likely to be followed. I
propose using our analysis to partition the high-risk
systems into three categories. The first would be systems
that are hopeless and should be abandoned because the
inevitable risks outweigh any reasonable benefits ... ;
the second, systems that we are either unlikely to be able
to do without but which could be made less risky with
considerable effort (some maritime transport), or where
the expected benefits are so substantial that some risks
should be run, but not as many as we are now
running ....
Finally, the third group includes those
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systems which, while hardly self-correcting in all
respects, are self-correcting to some degree and could be
further improved with quite modest efforts (chemical
plants, airliners and air traffic control, and a number of
systems we have not examined carefully ... 96
Banning an activity seems to be a rather radical option and
Perrow reserves it for the truly hopeless high risk system. In the
context of the Deepwater Horizon, the President's post-disaster
moratorium on deepwater drilling was a type of ban, whether
justified or not. I do not mean to imply that the ban was
appropriate or that offshore drilling on the high seas is an activity
belonging in Perrow's first category; I mean only to point out a
real world example of a ban.
The second category of systems for Perrow includes some
marine transport. He believes that marine transport, as it existed
when he wrote, was an error inducing system.97 It is error
inducing for many reasons, including organization, pressure to
perform, weather and more. Tort law can continue to play and
must play a key role in making these second category systems
safer. To the extent tort law does not adequately compensate the
victims who suffer injury as a result of accidents within those
systems, it is not fixing the system; it is contributing to the
preservation of worse systems. In the maritime context, I must
remind the reader of the liability-limiting aspects of the Jones Act
and DOHSA in wrongful death cases to which they apply, and the
Limitation of Liability Act. As for those systems, which Perrow
opines can be made safer with more modest efforts, tort liability
should still play a key role because if tort law optimally deters, the
world will be a safer place!
SYNCHRONICITY

Interestingly, as Perrow concluded his work, he asked a
simple question: "What is to be done"?98 He rejected the idea that
the causes or main problems are dumb operators, technology,
capitalism, and greed. 9 9 No, his culprit is none of the above.
96.

PERROW, supra note 5, at 304.

97.

Id. at 173.

98.

Id. at 339.

99.

Id.
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Rather, his culprit is "externalities."'0 0 "These are the social costs
of an activity ... that are not reflected in the price of the
activity."'
As I have argued above, externalities are a huge
potential problem in achieving optimal deterrence through torts
and they are just as big a problem for Perrow. Here our analyses
have truly come together. Thus, I believe our societal sights
should be set.
We need to create rules to limit the effects of externalities.
We need to come up with ways to encourage actors, particularly
those engaged in high risk activities, to consider all of the costs of
their activities, including all of the activity costs. We need to
make Michael Beard and the rest of us pay for all the costs of
satisfying our appetites.

100.

Id.

101.

Id. at 341.

